Question: Why do banks form credit networks?
Banks basically want to do two things:
- Make lots of money, and
- Generate liquidity
Very abstractly...banks can be divided into three broad classes:
- Pure lenders
- Pure borrowers
- Banks that do both (i.e., lend and borrow)
Now suppose that Bank 1 is willing to lend to Bank 2 but not to Bank 3 (for whatever reason...perhaps Bank 3 is too risky), but Bank 2 is willing to lend to Bank 3 (because Bank 2 has different risk tolerances...I suppose I have introduced my first heterogenous parameter). In this case the linkages generate liquidity because without them, Bank 3 would not have been able to borrow.
Question: How should returns to bank i from a link with bank j be defined?
At this point I am playing with the idea that the value of the link to the lender is something like the discounted present value of the money later minus costs (yet to be defined), while the value to the borrower is the loan amount minus costs (i.e., interest). How to set interest rate? Starting point would be to take interest rate as exogenous, but at the moment I am toying with the idea of having banks bargain locally over the interest rate. In the bargaining process the lender would have several outside options (i.e., either lending to another bank or parking his money in "risk-free" securities) the only outside options available to the borrower would be other banks.
All of this is highly specualtive at this point...but what should you expect on day one of a PhD career!
What does a link represent in your model? A link could be either a loan from one bank to another, or a (formal or informal) credit line, i.e. the option to take out a loan if necessary. How a bank assesses the value of a link will depend on whether a link is a loan or a credit line.
ReplyDeleteEndogenizing network formation is important, I gather that one shortcoming of the Bank of England literature on financial networks is that it largely takes network structure as exogenous - the only papers with endogenous network formation mentioned in this paper: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/wp383.pdf are Leitner, 'Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts' and Castiglione & Navarro, 'Optimal Fragile Financial Networks'